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Deng 
Xiaoping
The crushing of the Chinese stu- 
dfent democracy movement in 
June is not the first example of 
Deng Xiaoping’s hostility to stu­
dent-led movements.
During China’s Cultural Revolution 
(1966-69), he was accused of suppres­
sion of revolutionary students at Beijing 
University, and of suppression of the 
mass movement through the use of 
centrally controlled ‘work groups’ 
whose function was the containment of 
the movement within limits acceptable 
to the party hierarchy.
 ̂ He was also responsible for suppress­
ing the Democracy Wall movement in 
1978-79, as well as the Tiananmen mas­
sacre of June 4. The brutality of this 
latter incident has highlighted the need 
for a more critical evaluation of the his­
tory, policies and leadership style of 
Deng Xiaoping than has hitherto been 
very evident in left commentaries on 
China. *
T Deng was bom in 1904 in Sichuan 
Province into a landowning family and, 
following his middle school studies, 
travelled to France in 1920 to participate 
in a work-and-study scheme for 
Chinese students. While in France he 
joined the Socialist Youth League 
(1922) and the Chinese Communist 
Party (1924), and in 1926 he returned to 
China via Moscow where he studied for 
Several months at the Oriental Univer­
sity. Back in China he took up a post as 
instructor in the Political Department of 
lhe X i’an M ilitary and Political 
Academy established by the warlord 
Peng Yuxiang. With hindsight, one can 
Perceive in this Deng’s first official 
Position in the Chinese revolution, a 
feature which characterised much of his 
subsequent career and coloured his 
response to questions of leadership and 
the party’s relations with the masses; for
it was then, in 1926, that Deng’s career 
began to fuse the military and political 
approaches to revolution and social 
change. Between 1926 and 1949, the 
positions held by Deng almost invariab­
ly involved both military and political 
functions: political commissar of the 
Seventh Red Army, 1929; chief-of-staff 
of the Third Army Corps, 1930; lecturer 
in party history at the Red Army 
Academy, 1933; Director of the Politi­
cal Department of the First Army Corps 
during the Long March, 1934-35; and 
several political appointments within 
the army between 1936 and 1954.
Deng’s pre-1949 career followed a 
pattern showing his rise to prominence 
as the party’s man inside the military. 
His standing in both the party and 
military rose during the 1940s. He be­
came a Party Central Committee mem­
ber in 1945, and in 1949 one of three 
senior military and political leaders of 
the Southwest Military Region, a posi­
tion which he was to use as a 
springboard to enter politics at a nation­
al level in the newly established 
People’s Republic of China.
The Eighth Party Congress of Septem­
ber 1956 confirmed Deng’s meteoric 
rise to power. At this congress he 
delivered the second most important 
report (after the political work report 
given by Liu Shaoqi), which dwelt on 
the importance of collective leadership 
and party discipline. As a result of this 
Congress, Deng became the sixth most 
powerful figure in Chinese politics, 
being elected to the Standing Commit­
tee of the Politburo and general 
secretary of the Central Committee. Be­
tween 1956 and his disgrace during the 
Cultural Revolution Deng also con­
tinued to occupy a very senior position 
in the military hierarchy, as vice-chair 
of the National Defence Council. In 
July 1977 he was appointed Chief of the 
General Staff of the People’s Liberation 
Army (a position he was to hold until 
1980), and in 1981 and 1983 he was 
elected chair of the Military Commis­
sion and Central Military Commission 
respectively. While, during the 1980s, 
Deng has not occupied the most senior 
position within the party (indeed, in late 
1987 he relinquished all high-ranking 
party posts), there is no doubt that he is 
the real power behind the throne, the 
arbiter of any major party decision.
Deng’s dual career - military as well 
as political - goes some way to explain­
ing the violent response of the Chinese 
leadership in crushing the recent 
democracy movement. For here we 
have a paramount leader who not only 
has consistently asserted the vanguard 
role of the party, but whose under­
standing of the role of leadership in 
social change has inevitably been 
coloured by his long association with 
the m ilitary, an organisation 
predisposed to perceiving the use of 
force as a means of resolving seemingly 
intractable social problems. It was thus 
to the man on horseback that Deng 
turned when the authority of the party 
and his own leadership were seriously 
challenged by the student democracy 
movement; and the extent to which the 
military responded is indicative of his 
long and deep association with it.
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